Brand new magistrate reasoned you to definitely appellant was utilizing the MLA because a pretext in order to avert the new restrictions of STLA and concluded that appellee’s loan are impermissible within the MLA and really should become ruled because of the STLA

<¶>In its complaint, appellant sought to recover the unpaid principal balance on appellee’s loan, along with interest and fees permitted by the MLA, including a default charge and a returned-check charge. When appellee did not respond, appellant moved for a default judgment of $, plus interest of 25 percent per annum from . Appellee had paid a total of $35 toward his debt before appellant moved for default judgment.

However, brand new appellate-courtroom majority unearthed that an attraction-influence mortgage, by meaning, usually do not become one-fees financing

<¶>A magistrate initially recommended judgment for appellant in the amount of $ with 5 percent interest from . After appellant objected, the trial court referred the case back to the magistrate for an evidentiary hearing and a determination of whether the MLA applied to the loan. The magistrate held that appellant was unauthorized to make any short-term loan in Ohio because appellant was not registered under the STLA. The magistrate further held that even if the MLA applied, appellant’s loan to appellee was usurious, in part because it provided for excessive interest. The magistrate recommended judgment for appellant in the amount of $465 ($500 minus Scott’s $35 payment), plus interest at the statutory rate of 8 percent per year from . The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision, over appellant’s objections.

<¶>A split panel of the Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the municipal court’s judgment. 9th Dist. Lorain No. 11CA010030, 2012–Ohio–5566. The majority held that the MLA does not authorize single-installment loans and that by enacting the STLA, the General Assembly intended to prohibit all loans of short duration outside the confines of that act. Id. at ¶ 12. Judge Dickinson dissented, concluding that the single-installment loan here satisfied the MLA’s definition of “interest-bearing loan” and holding that the General Assembly’s supposed intent in enacting the STLA was insufficient to override the MLA’s clear authorization of this type of loan. Id. at ¶ 19, 24. Neither the majority nor the dissent addressed the validity of a 25–percent interest rate under the MLA.

<¶>This court accepted appellant’s discretionary appeal. 136 Ohio St.3d 1505, 2013–Ohio–4653, 995 N.E.2d 1209. Although appellee has not appeared before this court, numerous amici have ably presented argument in support of the lower courts’ judgments.

<¶>Appellant asks this court to decide whether the MLA permits single-installment, interest-bearing loans and, if so, whether the STLA prohibits MLA registrants from making single-installment loans of short duration. Carefully bearing in mind that we must apply statutory language as enacted by the General Assembly and that we are prohibited from acting in a legislative capacity, we answer the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative.

<¶>We first consider whether the MLA permits single-installment loans. The MLA permits both “interest-bearing” and “precomputed” loans, subject to different requirements as set forth in R.C. . Appellant does not contend that the MLA authorizes single-installment precomputed loans; R.C. (D)(1) requires payday loans IL Streator that precomputed loans are payable in “monthly installments of principal and interest combined,” signifying the necessity of multiple installments. (Emphasis added.) R.C. (C) does not similarly require that an interest-bearing loan be repayable in multiple installments. Thus, central to our resolution of this question is the statutory definition of “interest-bearing loan” as “a loan in which the debt is expressed as the principal amount and interest is computed, charged, and collected on unpaid principal balances outstanding from time to time.” R.C. (F).